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INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 1994, § 13981, also known as the Civil Rights
Remedy, of the Violence Against Women Act was signed into law by
President Clinton.1  Section 13981 provided a “federal substantive
right to all persons within the United States to be free from crimes
motivated by gender.”2 This provision created a private right of action
in a person injured by gender motivated violence against the person
who committed the act and obtain compensatory and punitive
damages.3  Furthermore, it allowed a victim to obtain injunctive,
declaratory, and other appropriate relief.4
In drafting § 13981, Congress amassed voluminous findings
detailing gender motivated violence and its effects on women.5
Congress found that the massive amount of violence being subjected
against women imposed an “artificial restriction on the market”6
having a substantial effect on interstate commerce, thereby bringing
it within the congressional realm to regulate under the Commerce
Clause.7  Furthermore, Congress found that state legal systems were
failing to provide protection to victims of gender-based violence, and
generally failing to grant women the right to receive equal
                                                          
1. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, § 40302, 108
Stat. 1941 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
3. See id. § 13981(c).
4. See id.
5. See Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act:
A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (2000) (noting that the legislative findings demonstrated
that violence and threat of violence is a constant in women’s lives).
6. See Amicus Curae brief for Petitioners at 9, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) (arguing that Congress had the power to regulate gender-motivated
violence under the Commerce Clause).
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
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protection8 of the laws in the Nation’s courts systems.9  Therefore,
Congress enacted § 13981 under the Commerce Clause, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, as an appropriate remedy to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause.10
However, in United States v. Morrison,11 the Supreme Court reviewed
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s holding
that § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act was
unconstitutional.12  In affirming the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, the
Supreme Court held that, despite the legislative findings, Congress
lacked the constitutional authority to enact § 13981 under the
Commerce Clause, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
FACTS OF THE CASE
On September 21, 1994, Antonio Morrison and James Crawford
were alleged to have raped Christy Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute (“Virginia Tech”), within the first thirty minutes
of their meeting.14  Furthermore, Christy Brzonkala claimed that in
the months following the rape, Morrison made comments in the
dormitory’s dining room that he liked to “get girls drunk and f***
the s*** out of them.”15  Brzonkala felt very depressed after the rape
occurred,16 and shortly thereafter, she stopped attending classes and
withdrew from school.17
Before Brzonkala pursued an action in federal court, she filed a
complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech’s
                                                          
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
9. See S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 48 (“The Violence Against Women Act is intended to
respond both to the underlying attitude that this violence is somehow less serious than other
crimes and to the resulting failure of our criminal justice system to address such violence.”).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (delegating to Congress the authority “to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article”); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
11. 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000), aff’g 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), vacating as moot
132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), rev’g 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996).
12. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 889 (4th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (holding that Congress lacked the authority to enact the Civil Rights Remedy).
13. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (affirming the Fourth Circuit decision).
14. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir.
1997) (discussing that Brzonkala only knew Morrison and Crawford by their first names and by
their status as members of the football team).
15. Id. at 953.
16. See id. (noting Brzonkala’s depth of depression).
17. See id. (stating that Brzonkala ultimately attempted suicide and received a retroactive
withdrawal from the university for the 1994-95 school year because of the trauma).
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Sexual Assault Policy.18  In a university hearing, Morrison admitted
that he had sexual intercourse with Brzonkala after she had
repeatedly told him no.19 However, the Virginia Tech Judicial
Committee found insufficient evidence to punish Crawford, who
denied having sexual intercourse with Brzonkala, and only sentenced
Morrison to immediate suspension for two semesters for sexual
assault.20
Morrison appealed his conviction under Virginia Tech’s Sexual
Assault Policy and was granted a second hearing under the
university’s Abusive Conduct Policy.21  As a result of this second
hearing, the Judicial Committee found Morrison guilty and
sentenced him again to a two-semester suspension.22  However, the
university found him guilty of using abusive language, not of
committing sexual assault.23  Morrison once again appealed his
conviction and Virginia Tech’s Vice President set aside Morrison’s
punishment, concluding that it was too excessive.24  After Christy
Brzonkala learned that Morrison would be returning25 to Virginia
Tech, she dropped out of the university.26
Brzonkala, frustrated by the efforts at the university level in her
attempt to punish Morrison and Crawford, pursued her right to be
free from gender-motivated violence under § 13981 in federal court.27
Upon Brzonkala’s filing an action in Federal district court, the
defendants Morrison and Crawford motioned to dismiss her claim on
the grounds that she did not state a claim under § 13981.28
                                                          
18. See id. at 954 (commenting that criminal charges were not filed against Morrison and
Crawford for lack of physical evidence).
19. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954.
20. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (discussing Morrison’s
culpability); see also Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954 (discussing the evidence available against
Crawford).
21. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 603 (identifying that since the Sexual Assault Policy had not
been widely disseminated to the students, the University decided to re-prosecute Brzonkala’s
complaint under the old policy).
22. See id.
23. See id. (noting that university officials lessened Morrison’s offense without offering an
explanation).
24. See id. (citing Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955) (discussing the excessiveness of Morrison’s
punishment “when compared with other cases where has been found a violation of the Abusive
Conduct Policy”).
25. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955 (noting that Morrison did return to Virginia Tech in 1995
on a full athletic scholarship).
26. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604.
27. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 827 (referring, en banc, to Christy Brzonkala’s right of action
in federal court under § 13981).
28. See id. at 828 (citing Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
779, 785 (W.D. Va. 1996) (disagreeing with the defendants’ claim that the plaintiff must allege
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Furthermore, the defendants argued that even if Brzonkala did state
such a claim, § 13981 was unconstitutional.29  As a result of this
allegation, the United States intervened to defend Congress’ action
in enacting the statute.30
However, the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Virginia held that while Brzonkala did state a claim under the
Violence Against Women Act, Congress did not have the authority to
enact § 13981 under the Commerce Clause.31  The court also
concluded that § 13981 was not a valid congressional enactment
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was not closely
tailored enough to remedy equal protection violations.32  Moreover,
the district court held that § 13981 was not directed at remedying
violations of equal protection by the States, since it regulated
individuals responsible for gender-motivated violence, rather than
those acting under the “color of state law.”33
The United States and Christy Brzonkala appealed the court’s
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
On December 23, 1997, a divided panel of the court decided that §
13981 was a valid congressional enactment under the U.S.
Constitution.34  However, on February 2, 1998, the full court vacated
the judgment and reheard the case en banc on March 3, 1998.35  On
March 5, 1999, the Fourth Circuit held that Congress had exceeded
its authority under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in enacting § 13981 and affirmed the district court
                                                          
facts, such as other sexual assaults, to contend that the alleged rape was motivated by gender
bias).
29. Id. (citing Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 785, that an analysis of the constitutionality of the
Violence Against Women Act must follow a determination that the plaintiff has successfully
stated a claim for a violation of its provisions).
30. Id. (defending the congressional enactment of § 13981 of the Violence Against Women
Act, as constitutional under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and under Article 1, § 8 of the
U.S. Constitution).
31. See id. at 828 (citing Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 801, that § 13981 was not sufficiently
related to interstate commerce to justify congressional regulation).
32. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 829 (contending that women who do not suffer gender bias
by the states, and therefore cannot assert that there has been a violation of equal protection,
can still pursue a cause of action under § 13981).
33. Id. (citing Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 797) (finding that congressional regulation of
private acts of gender-motivated violence under the Fourteenth Amendment is not consistent
with Supreme Court precedent).
34. See id. at 828 (discussing the prior history of United States v. Morrison); see also Brzonkala,
132 F.3d at 974 (holding that § 13981 did not exceed the scope of Congress’ authority under
the Commerce Clause).  The court, however, did not address whether it was a valid enactment
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.
35. See United States v. Morrison, 169 F.3d 820, 828 (4th Cir. 1999).
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opinion.36  Because the Fourth Circuit opinion invalidated a federal
statute on constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari.37
HOLDING
In affirming the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, the Supreme Court
began by reviewing petitioner’s assertion that
§ 13981 was constitutional under the Commerce Clause by primarily
reiterating its own findings in United States v. Lopez.38 As with the Gun
Free School Zones Act of 1990,39 in Lopez, the Court held that the
Civil Rights Remedy was unconstitutional because it did not
substantially affect interstate commerce.40  Specifically, the Court
emphasized that it has only sustained legislation under the
Commerce Clause as having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce when the activity in question has had an economic basis.41
The petitioners relied heavily on the Congressional findings in
favor of the Violence Against Women Act to support their assertion
that § 13981 was constitutional under the Commerce Clause.42
However, the Court concluded that the link between gender-
motivated violence and the finding of a substantial effect on
interstate commerce was too attenuated.43  Lastly, as was also a factor
in striking down the statutory provision in Lopez, the Supreme Court
held that § 13981 lacked a specific jurisdictional element limiting its
reach and furthering its connection to interstate commerce.44
                                                          
36. See id. at 889.
37. See United States v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999) (granting certiorari without
expansion).
38. 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (discussing the three categories of interstate commerce that
can be regulated under the Commerce Clause); see also id. at 559 (holding that a proper test of
whether an activity can be regulated by Congress under the third category is whether the
activity in question “substantially affects interstate commerce”).
39. See Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
40. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (rejecting petitioner’s
argument that Congress may regulate non–economic activity “based solely on the conduct’s
aggregate affect on interstate commerce”).
41. See id. at 1750 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560)(“Where economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”).
42. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (commenting on the numerous congressional findings in
support of § 13981 in contrast to the Lopez decision, but holding that numerous findings are not
enough to sustain its constitutionality).
43. Id. at 610 (concluding that if the Court was willing to let the Commerce Clause power
extend into all areas having an aggregate effect on interstate commerce, almost everything
could be regulated under it because of the nature of our interdependent society).
44. See id. at 613 (arguing that Lopez had given the drafters of § 13981 an advance warning
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Further, the Supreme Court reviewed the petitioners’ assertion
that § 13981 was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.45  Although the petitioners argued that §
13981 was enacted by Congress to combat pervasive gender bias in
state judicial systems, the Supreme Court, citing its decisions in the
Civil Rights Cases46 and United States v. Harris,47 held that § 13981 was
directed towards private individual conduct, not state action.48
Additionally, the majority opinion emphasized that although
congressional findings demonstrated gender bias in particular state
judicial systems, the findings failed to show that there was pervasive
gender bias nationwide.49  Therefore, the Court asserted that § 13981
lacked proportionality to the state discrimination that it purported to
remedy and therefore could not be upheld under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.50
DISSENTING OPINIONS
The Morrison dissent began with a general reaffirmation of
congressional power to regulate activity that has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.51  Furthermore, the dissent reiterated that
the purpose of judicial review is only to confirm that Congress had a
rational basis for enacting a particular regulation.52  Moreover,
contrary to the majority opinion, the dissent emphasized that the
massive congressional findings accumulated in support of the
Violence Against Women Act were conclusive in demonstrating
                                                          
that a jurisdictional element limiting the reach of the federal regulation would better support
the contention that the civil rights remedy was sufficiently related to interstate commerce).
45. Id. at 619 (noting that § 5 grants Congress the ability to “enforce by appropriate
legislation the constitutional guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law”).
46. 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment calls for remedies
against state actors, not individual discriminators).
47. 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883) (holding that Congress did not have the authority to enact a
law that allowed citizens to intrude upon one another’s rights).
48. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 624-25 (citing the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3)
(concluding that § 13981 cannot be sustained under § 5 because it is directed to remedying the
actions of private individuals who have committed criminal acts, not state action).
49. See id. at 627.
50. See id. at 625-26 (holding that legislation enacted under § 5 must have a “congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedies and the means adopted to
that end”).
51. See id. at 628-31 (Souter, J., dissenting) (identifying congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause).
52. See id. (arguing that the purpose of judicial review is not to determine the soundness of
a congressional enactment, but only to conclude that Congress had a rational basis for doing
so).
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Congress’ rational basis for enacting § 13981.53  The dissent also
argued that since the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wickard v.
Fillburn,54 case precedent clearly demonstrated that Congress had the
ability to regulate any activity that, in the aggregate, had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.55
Secondly, the dissent addressed the Court’s reliance on the fact
that although Congress’ Commerce Clause power is enumerated,
there are some subjects that are excluded from the exercise of this
power.56  Contrasting the majority opinion, the dissent argued that
congressional power to regulate commerce is plenary.57  Therefore,
limiting this power is only acceptable when the regulated activity does
not affect interstate commerce, or interferes with an area traditionally
left to the States, such as the exercise of police power.58
Souter’s dissent argued that the Court, with its decision in Morrison,
returned to the formalistic approach and interpretation of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, by limiting its
reach to only commercial, or economic activities.59  This formalistic
approach to congressional Commerce Clause power was most evident
before the Court’s decision in Wickard, when it rejected its prior case
precedent limiting congressional exercise of its Commerce Clause
power on “direct” and “indirect” forms of commerce.60  The dissent
argued that this return to a formalistic approach served the purpose
of advancing the majority’s conception of federalism, and protection
of areas it considered traditional state concern,61 and does not take
into account the realities of an integrated national commerce.62
The dissenting opinions concluded with Justice Breyer, who briefly
addressed the congressional authority to enact § 13981 under § 5 of
                                                          
53. See id. at 629 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sufficiency of the evidence before
Congress to provide a rational basis for the finding cannot seriously be questioned.”).
54. 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (holding that even homegrown wheat, produced for
personal consumption, could raise market prices and have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce).
55. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that § 13981 would have
passed constitutional muster if it had been presented to the Supreme Court during the period
between Wickard in 1942 and Lopez in 1995).
56. See id. at 639 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing Congress’ enumerated powers).
57. See id. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 639 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Commerce Clause does not give
Congress the authority to regulate any subject not affecting commerce).
59. See id. at 642 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 642 (arguing that the distinction between commercial and
non–commercial activities is contrary to the Court’s cases since Wickard).
61. See id.. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting)(“Just as the old formalism had value in the service
of an economic conception, the new one is useful in serving a conception of federalism.”).
62. See id. at 655 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the Fourteenth Amendment.63  Justice Breyer argued that § 13981 was
directed at remedying discriminatory justice systems and conduct of
state officials, which provided inadequate remedies for women who
were victims of gender-based violence.64  Therefore, in addition to §
13981 being constitutional under the Commerce Clause, it was
possibly constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES
Nowhere has the curtailment of congressional Commerce Clause
power been more apparent than in the Court’s decision in United
States v. Morrison.65 The implications for future regulations under the
Commerce Clause are staggering. In Lopez, a significant reason the
Court did not sustain the Gun Free School Zones Act was because
Congress had failed to demonstrate, with adequate findings, how the
activity resulted in a substantial effect on interstate commerce.66  In
drafting § 13981, Congress attempted to combat the lack of findings
in Lopez, with massive amounts of findings to support the Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act.67  However, the holding
in Morrison demonstrates that findings are not enough to
demonstrate that a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce.68  As the dissent appropriately stated, the Morrison
decision was an example of a congressional enactment being
subjected to a higher standard of review than rational basis.69
Although Congress had a rational basis for finding that gender-
                                                          
63. See id. at 662-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing “procedural limitations” are relevant
considerations when evaluating Congress’ actions under the Commerce Clause, and reaffirming
the power of Congress, under § 5, to enact legislation that would enforce the Equal Protection
Clause).
64. See id. at 664 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 14
(1883), and arguing that unlike the Civil Rights Cases where the statute did not “profess to be
corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by the States,” § 13981 was intended to
correct gender bias in judicial systems nationwide).  See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883).
65. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (emphasizing that the purpose
of the Commerce Clause is to regulate primarily economic activities, and not justify broad
regulation of the states by Congress).
66. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (arguing that findings assist the judiciary in evaluating
whether the activity in question substantially effects interstate commerce).
67. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (discussing the reliance on legislative findings that
demonstrated the substantial adverse effect of gender-based violence on interstate commerce).
68. See id. (“Simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.”).
69. See id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Although a new jurisprudence has not emerged
with any distinctness, it is clear that some congressional conclusions about obviously substantial,
cumulative effects on commerce are being assigned lesser values than the once–stable doctrine
would assign them.”).
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motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce, the
Morrison decision implies that the Supreme Court may only sustain
regulations under the Commerce Clause when the regulated activity
has an economic basis.70 Essentially, if Congress identifies a non–
economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, it
would be powerless to regulate the activity under the Commerce
Clause, making any regulation of it subject to much stricter judicial
review.71  Therefore, it appears from the Morrison decision that any
regulation of a non–economic activity based on the Commerce
Clause would be merely symbolic.
Further, the Court’s decision regarding the inability of
§ 13981 to be sustained under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
raises serious questions regarding the ability of Congress to propose
national legislation under § 5.72  It seems that Congress would have to
demonstrate that the particular problem exists in every state, or that a
particular public official is culpable of gender bias.73  Arguably, the
Court prefers that gender bias be handled at the State level.74
However, congressional findings demonstrate that violence against
women and the gender bias pervasive in the nation’s judicial system is
a serious problem on a national scale, incapable of being solved if it is
confined to a state level.75
CONCLUSION
Although § 13981 has been held unconstitutional, there exists a
hope that the impetus that caused Congress to enact this legislation,
will be transferred to the States and the population as a whole.
Women who are victims, or future victims of gender-based violence,
face the current problem that this type of violence is still considered a
                                                          
70. See id. at 611 (noting Lopez’s holding that for an activity to be regulated under the
commerce clause it must be part of some “economic endeavor”).
71. Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that it would be inappropriate to require
that Congress demonstrate the existence of gender bias in every state prior to proposing a
national solution).
73. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (articulating that § 13981 was not
directed towards specific states or public officials practicing or promoting gender bias in the
nation’s judicial system).
74. See Marcia Coyle, A Court Revolution Brewing? Justices Tinker with Federalism Trend, but
Watch Out Next Term, NAT’L L.J., June 5, 2000, at A1 (arguing that the Supreme Court advanced
its federalist ideals regarding the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause in its Morrison
decision).
75. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 666 (referencing that Congress in enacting § 13981,
considered task force reports from at least twenty-one states, documenting pervasive and
unconstitutional discrimination against women who were victims of gender violence).
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product of private relationships and not subject to either federal
regulation or public interference.76  Any attempt to remedy violence
against women, or the bias they experience in the judicial system, will
only be effective when there is a realization that violence against
women reflects, “as much a failure of our Nation’s collective
willingness to confront the problem as it does the failure of the
Nation’s laws and regulations.”77
AMBRE HOWARD
                                                          
76. See Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against
Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN[‘S] L.J. 1 (1996). The author comments on the
fact that acquaintance rape, domestic violence, marital rape, and incest are all examples of
crimes that categorize themselves by relationship. See id. at 1.
77. S. REP. NO. 101-138, at 37 (1993).
